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Abstract
Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-
determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions
a¤ect employeesself-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the
absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to di¤erentiate between
employees on the basis of their abilities, and (2) to terminate employment of
employees on probation. Generally, organizations benet from committing to
strict rules for various HRM practices.
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1 Introduction
An important question in almost any organization is to what extent decisions on the
career paths of employees should be based on pre-determined rules or should be left
to the discretion of managers. One reason to give discretion to managers is that their
knowledge about the performances and abilities of employees enable them to tailor their
decisions to the information they have. A well-known problem of giving discretion is
shirking among managers. For example, dismissing an employee is often a painful
process, both for the manager and for the employee being red. Managers may tend to
keep less competent employees to avoid the trouble of ring them. Likewise, it may be
hard for managers to di¤erentiate employees on the basis of their abilities. It is easier
to say to John that he did a better job than Pete than to say to Pete that he did a worse
job than John. An implication is that it might be easier for a manager to abstain from
di¤erentiating on the basis of abilities, for instance, by basing promotion decisions
(or allocations of tasks) on seniority. Nevertheless, it may be in the interest of an
organization that incompetent employees are red, and that tasks are allocated on the
basis of relative abilities. Another possible advantage of pre-determined rules is that
in the absence of them, managers may be more prone to favoritism (see Prendergast
and Topel, 1993 and 1996).
In the present paper, we point out that apart from moral hazard problems that
may arise from giving discretion to managers there exists another rationale for pre-
determined rules for HRM practises. We show that in environments where HRM de-
cisions a¤ect employeesself-images and thereby their motivation, the absence of rules
makes managers too reluctant to dismiss less competent employees and too reluctant
to di¤erentiate employees on the basis of abilities. The reason is that under discretion
a manager makes decisions on the basis of realized characteristics of employees. Rules,
however, are based on all possible realized characteristics. More specically, under
discretion HRM practices are based on their incentives e¤ects on employees at the
margin, whereas under predetermined rules HRM practices are based on their e¤ects
on all employees.
We derive our results from models that are based on three important assumptions.
First, e¤ort and ability are complementary. This is more or less a standard assumption.
Second, employees are uncertain about their own abilities. Third, HRM decisions
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contain information about the employeesabilities. The last two assumptions can be
justied by a huge literature in social psychology that shows that people are uncertain
about a wide range of abilities or skills (see, for example, Ackerman, Beier and Bowen,
2002, and Kruger, 1999). People form a view of themselves, in general, and of their
abilities in particular, through three main sources (Aronson, Wilson, and Akert, 2005).
One source is introspection. A second source is experience (learning by doing), and the
third source is how they are perceived and treated by others. For the present paper, this
third source is essential. Key in our model is that a managers decisions on employees
careers may contain information about how the manager perceives employees. As a
consequence, these decisions may inuence employees self-perceptions, and in turn their
motivation. In situations where ability and e¤ort are complementary, employees with
a more positive self-image tend to expend more e¤ort.
In the present paper we show how two HRM practices impact on employeesperfor-
mance through their e¤ects on their self-images. We rst analyze a model in which a
manager places new employees in probation. After having learnt an employees ability
in a probationary period, the manager decides whether to replace the employee or to
keep him. In this model, the manager follows a simple threshold strategy. Keep the
employee if and only if his ability exceeds a threshold. Obviously, the decision about
the future of the employee contains information about his ability. Giving an employee
a permanent position boosts his condence and may improve his performance. We
show that this e¤ect may induce managers to be too lenient. Managers give perma-
nent positions to employees who (in expected terms) are less able than their possible
substitutes. More importantly, we show that a manager would benet if, before she
knows the ability of the agent, she could commit to a stricter threshold. This result
suggests the need for clear guidelines stipulating the conditions under which employ-
ees are o¤ered long-term positions. Some universities use such guidelines for tenure
decisions.
The second HRM practice we analyze is di¤erentiation between employees on the
basis of their relative abilities. Di¤erentiation can take various forms. For example, a
manager may promote Pete instead of John. She may give more attention to Pete than
to John, or give Pete nicer tasks. A manager may also abstain from di¤erentiation on
the basis of abilities. Boring tasks can be alternated with more challenging tasks, and
promotion can be based on seniority. We discuss the model of Crutzen, Swank and
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Visser (2010) that analyzes how a managers di¤erentiation decision a¤ects employees
self-image and e¤ort decisions. We show that di¤erentiation boosts one employees
self-image at the cost of the other employees self-image. A manager di¤erentiates
if Pete is much more able than John, and vice versa. If Petes ability is close to
Johns, their manager treats them equally. The main result of this section is that
if managers could commit to a di¤erentiation strategy, they would di¤erentiate for
much wider ranges of abilities. As with the decision to keep or replace employees,
with di¤erentiation decisions (promotion, allocating tasks, etc.) in expected terms
organizations benet from guidelines that stipulate the conditions under which the
manager should di¤erentiate between employees.
In the third part of the paper, we present a model in which a manager supervising
two employees can conduct both HRM policies. The most striking result from this
model is that the manager may decide to keep a completely unproductive employee
even though she can replace him with a productive new employee. The reason for this,
for us, surprising result is that by sending an employee away, a manager gives up the
possibility of di¤erentiation on ability. Johns perception of his ability may be more
positive if he is promoted and Pete is allowed to stay in the organization than when he
his promoted and Pete is red. Also, in the model where the manager can conduct both
HRM policies, the manager often abstains from di¤erentiation and ring employees. A
manager who can commit himself would be far less lenient to terminate employment
during probation and would di¤erentiate much more often.
As discussed above, an important idea behind the models developed in this paper
is that people increase their self-knowledge by viewing themselves through the eyes of
others. This idea is well-known to social-psychologists who refer to it as the "looking-
glass self". Benabou and Tirole (2003) applied the looking-glass self to management.
They show, among other things, that giving an individual a challenging task signals
condence and consequently motivates (see also Ishida, 2006, and Swank and Visser,
2007). Interim performance feedback may also a¤ect employees motivation (see, for
example, Ertac, 2005, and Ederer, 2010). Like in these papers, in our paper HRM deci-
sions a¤ect employeesincentives through the looking-glass self. However, the emphasis
of our paper is on the question whether organization may benet from commitment to
rules as to HRM policies. More remotely, our paper is related to the older literature
on rules versus discretion (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977).
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We think that our paper makes both a positive and a more normative contribution
to the existing literature. From a positive point of view, our model explains why in the
absence of clear guidelines at the end of a probationary period employees may get the
benet of the doubt. Moreover, our model explains seniority based promotion rules
and why managers tend to assign relatively uniform performance ratings to employees
(see Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman, 2009). Our results are also consistent with
Bewley (1999) who after more than 300 interviews with businesspeople was surprised
by the extent to which "employers chose to impose bureaucratic constraints on their
decision making" (Bewley, 1999, p.65). From a normative point of view, this paper
demonstrates the potential importance of guidelines for all kind of HRM practices.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model in which
a manager makes two types of HRM decisions, keeping or replacing an employee, and
di¤erentiating between employees. Section 3 presents the equilibrium of the model in
which the manager only decides to keep employees or to replace them. Next, Section
4 presents the equilibrium in which the manager chooses to di¤erentiate employees
or to treat them equally. Section 5 presents equilibria of the total model. Sections
3-5 consist of two parts. In the rst part, HRM decisions are left to the discretion of
managers. In the second part, HRM decisions are based on rules specied in advance.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model describes how management of employees inuences employeesself-images,
and in turn e¤ort and output. We consider a manager (she) who runs a unit of two
employees, i = f1; 2g. Output of the unit depends on the e¤ort levels employees
choose, e1 and e2, and on their abilities, a1 and a2. The individual output levels equal
yi = aiei. Key in our model is that the manager has a more accurate view of the
employeesabilities than the employees themselves. One can best think of our model
as a two-period model. In the rst period, two new employees enter the unit. No
real production takes place, but thanks to years of experience with subordinates the
manager can accurately assess the employeesabilities. As a result, at the end of period
1 the manager knows a1 and a2, while the employees only know that a1 and a2 are iid
random variables with a uniform distribution on [0; 1].
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The manager is responsible for human resource management. In our model, HRM
can be divided in two facets. First, the manager can keep an employee or replace
him with another one. When the manager replaces employee i, ri, the new employee,
inew, has an expected ability equal to z. With a slight abuse of notation, we write
E (ainew jri) = z, where E is the expectation operator. For simplicity, we assume
that the manager does not have the time to learn the new employees strengths and
weaknesses, implying that the new employee and the manager are equally well informed
about the new employees ability. We assume that z  1
2
. The implication is that the
expected ability of the new employee is not higher than the expected ability of an
employee present in period 1. Second, in case the manager decides that both employees
stay in her unit, she can choose between (i) treating both employees equally, and (ii)
to favor one over the other. In practice, there are many ways in which a manager may
di¤erentiate between employees. She can give one employee more challenging tasks,
more guidance, a larger o¢ ce, etc. In this paper, we are agnostic about the specic
form of di¤erentiation. We simply model it as a message. One implication is that
it does not directly a¤ect the productivity of employees. However, a message may
contain information about employeesabilities. As we will show, through this channel,
di¤erentiating or abstaining from it a¤ects e¤ort. All in all, a manager can choose
among six messages. The rst column of Table 1 describes these messages. The second
column of Table 1 shows how we denote them.
Possible messages notation
Facet 1 Probation
Replace both 1 and 2 m (a1; a2) = r1+2
Keep 1 replace 2 m (a1; a2) = r2
Keep 2 replace 1 m (a1; a2) = r1
Keep 1 and 2, no di¤erentiation m (a1; a2) = 1  2
Facet 2 Di¤erentiation
Keep both 1 and 2, favor 1 over 2 m (a1; a2) = 1  2
Keep both 1 and 2, favor 2 over 1 m (a1; a2) = 2  1
Table 1: Possible actions of the manager
Output is divided by the manager and the employees who eventually do the work.
Each agent bears the cost of his own e¤ort. To drive home the main points of our paper
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in the simplest way we assume a quadratic cost of e¤ort function (c (ei) = 12e
2
i ). The
payo¤ to the manager equals (1  ) (y1 + y2). The payo¤ to employee i (if working in
period 2) equals yi   12e2i . The payo¤ to an employee who is replaced equals zero.
We solve the model by identifying a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which (i)
each employees e¤ort strategy is optimal given the managers HRM strategy and the
employees beliefs about his ability; (ii) the managers HRM strategy is optimal given
the employeese¤ort strategies and the employeesbeliefs about their ability; and (iii)
beliefs are updated according to Bayesrule. The managers strategy maps employees
abilities into a message, m(a1; a2). Employee is e¤ort strategy maps a message into
an e¤ort level, ei (m).
We divide the analysis in four parts. First, below we derive the e¤ort employee i
exerts, givenm and his beliefs about his ability. Second, in the next section, we restrict
the message set of the manager to M = fr1+2; r1; r2; 1  2g. We refer to this model
as the Probation Model. In the Appendix, we deal with a more general version of the
Probation model. The manager hires an employee for a probationary period (period 1).
If his ability is su¢ ciently high, the employee is also hired in the second period. Third,
in Section 4 we present the analysis of the model in which the managers message set
is restricted to M = f1  2; 1  2; 2  1g. A more general version of this model, to
which we refer as the model of di¤erentiation, is fully discussed in Crutzen, Swank and
Visser (2010). Finally, we identify Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for the entire game. As
there are no closed-form solutions for this game, we rely on numerical examples.
As discussed above, the essential feature of our model is that the manager has su-
perior knowledge about the employeesabilities. In equilibrium, the managers choices
may contain information that is relevant for the employees. For example, as we discuss
below, under certain conditions an employee who is allowed to stay may infer that his
ability exceeds a certain threshold. To focus on the transmission of information from
the manager to the employees through HRM policy, we have kept the e¤ort decision
of the employees as simple as possible. In the three models discussed below, the e¤ort
decision of employee i results from maximizing E
 
aiei   12e2i jm

, yielding
ei (m) = a^i (m) (1)
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where a^i (m) is the expectation of ai, conditional on message m.1 Note that einew (ri) =
einew (r1+2) = z. Furthermore note that e¤ort and ability are complements. The
higher is a^i (m), the higher is e¤ort. The implication is that the manager wants em-
ployees to have positive self-images.
In the model presented above, the manager sends a message after she has observed
a1 and a2. The model thus describes a situation where the manager has full discretion.
An alternative setting is that HRM rules are set in advance, that is before a1 and a2
are observed. For example, one rule may stipulate the conditions in terms of ai under
which a manager may keep employee i. Of course, such rules only make sense if the
manager is committed to follow them. For all models, we also derive the equilibria
under commitment.
3 Equilibrium of the Probation Model
In this section, we assume that M 2 fr1; r2; r1+2; 1  2g. The manager has to decide
whether the employees may stay or not. We refer to this model as the probation model.
Clearly, the more able an employee is, the higher is his value for the manager. As a
consequence, it is optimal for the manager to follow a threshold strategy. Given the
posteriors a^1(m) and a^2 (m), and given (1), we must determine for which (a1; a2) the
manager prefers a certain message to the other messages. For each pair of messages the
following equations denote the values of a1 and a2 for which the manager is indi¤erent
between two messages
2z2 = z2 + a1a^1 (r2) (2)
2z2 = z2 + a2a^2 (r1) (3)
2z2 = a1a^1 (1  2) + a2a^2 (1  2) (4)
z2 + a1a^1 (r2) = a1a^1 (1  2) + a2a^2 (1  2) (5)
z2 + a2a^2 (r1) = a1a^1 (1  2) + a2a^2 (1  2) (6)
Equation (2) shows the condition under which the manager is indi¤erent between send-
ing both employees away on the one hand, and sending only employee 2 away on the
1The employees expected payo¤ exceeds zero, implying that an employee who is allowed to stay
also wants to stay. In other words, the participation contraint is always satised.
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other. This condition implies that if a1 exceeds a threshold a1 > z
2
a^1(r2)
, r2 leads to a
higher payo¤ than r1+2. Equation (3) yields a similar threshold value for a2. Equation
(4) shows the condition under which the manager is indi¤erent between keeping both
employees and sending both employees away. Equation (5) gives the condition under
which the manager is indi¤erent between keeping only member 1 and keeping both
members. Equation (6) gives this condition for employee 2. Using (3) and (5), and
imposing symmetry [ba1 (1  2) = ba2 (1  2) and ba1 (r1) = ba2 (r2) , and employees are
treated in the same way]2, we obtain that a^1 (r2) = a^2 (r1) = a^1 (1  2) = a^2 (1  2),
so that a1a^1 (1  2) = z2. Hence, the expected ability of an employee who is allowed to
stay in the organization is independent of what the manager decides about the other
employee. In other words, employee i may stay if ai exceeds a threshold, and this
threshold does not depend on a i. Denote this threshold by a. Bayesrule implies
that a^1 (r2) = E (a1ja1 > a) = 12 (1 + a). Using (2), it follows that
2z2 = z2 + a
1
2
(1 + a), implying
a =
1
2
p
1 + 8z2   1

(7)
Equation (7) shows that the more able is the potential substitute for employee i, the
higher is the threshold a. Somewhat more surprising is that for 0 < z < 1, a < z.
This means that the manager may keep an employee, even though she can replace him
with a more able employee. To understand this result suppose that a = z. Then, from
an ability point of view, the manager is indi¤erent between keeping the employee and
sending him away. However, a new employee would exert less e¤ort than an employee
who is allowed to stay [z < 1
2
(1 + a) if a = z]. To compensate for this e¤ect, a must
be lower than z. Proposition 1 summarizes the discussion above.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium of the probation model exists in which
(i) if m = r1+2 or m = ri, einew = z;
(ii) if m = 1  2, or m = r i, ei = a^i (1  2) = a^i (r i);
(iii) the manager keeps employee i if ai > a = 12
 p
1 + 8z2   1, with a < z, and
replaces i otherwise;
(iv) a^i (r i) = a^i (1  2) = 14
 p
1 + 8z2 + 1

; a^i (ri) = a^i (r1+2) =
1
4
 p
1 + 8z2   1
2The next section deals with di¤erentiation.
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3.1 Commitment
We now derive the managers HRM strategy if before she observes the employees
abilities she stipulates the conditions under which each employee is allowed to stay. Let
ac;i denote the optimal threshold for member i under commitment. When determining
the thresholds, the manager anticipates the employeese¤ort strategies. The expected
payo¤ to the manager when choosing the thresholds equals
UM
 
ac;1; a

c;2

=  (1  )
2X
i=1

Pr
 
ai  ac;i

z2 + Pr
 
ai > a

c;i
 1
4
 
1 + ac;i
2
=  (1  )
2X
i=1

ac;iz
2 +
 
1  ac;i
 1
4
 
1 + ac;i
2
(8)
Maximizing (8) with respect to ac;i yields
ac;i =
2
3
p
3z2 + 1  1
3
(9)
Straightforward calculations show that ac;i > z.
3 Thus, under commitment, if z <
ai  ac;i, the manager replaces employee i even though the new employee is less able.
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider the extreme case that z = 0.
Equation (9) shows that in that case, the manager should replace employee i if ac;i <
1
3
. Clearly, ex post, this is a sub-optimal action. There is a clear cost of replacing
a productive person with a completely unproductive person. The benet of a high
threshold lies in highly able persons exerting more e¤ort. It is much more important
that highly able employees have a positive self-esteem than that mediocre employees
have a positive self-esteem. For this reason, the manager is willing to sacrice output
in case employees turn out to be mediocre in return of higher output if employees turn
out to be very able.
The main di¤erence between the non-commitment and the commitment case is that
in the non-commitment case the manager provides incentives to the marginal employee,
while in the commitment case the manager provides information to all employees. More
3 2
3
p
3z2 + 1  13 > z ! 12z2 + 4 > 9z2 + 6z + 1 ! 3 (z   1)2 > 0, which is always true.
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specically, in the non-commitment case, the manager decides whether or not to keep
an employee, given the employees ability and given the inferences the employee draws
from the managers decision. In the commitment case, by contrast, the manager takes
into account the consequences of her HRM decisions for the inferences employees draw.
Moreover, in the commitment case HRM decisions are made with a view on inuencing
all types of employees rather than on inuencing a single type.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the manager can commit herself to an HRM strategy
before she observes the employees abilities. Then, an equilibrium exists in which
(i) if m = r1+2 or m = ri, einew = z;
(ii) if m = 1  2, or m = r i, ei = a^i (1  2) = a^i (r i);
(iii) the manager keeps employee i if ai > ac;i =
2
3
p
3z2 + 1   1
3
, with ac;i > z, and
replaces i otherwise;
(iv) a^i (r i) = a^i (1  2) = 13
 p
3z2 + 1 + 1

; a^i (ri) = a^i (r1+2) =
1
3
p
3z2 + 1  1
6
Proposition 1 and 2 can be translated into practical terms as follows. Many rms
hire employees initially on a temporary basis. Those who perform well get a permanent
position. In the absence of clear guidelines about the conditions under which employ-
ees should be o¤ered a more permanent position, managers tend to be (too) lenient.
The focus is on the cost and benet of o¤ering this particular employee a permanent
position. Employees who can be replaced by more able employees are allowed to stay.
Guidelines, stipulating the conditions under which employees are o¤ered a permanent
position, by contrast, will be quite strict. They may even seem unfair to the individ-
ual employee. For example, the guidelines sometimes lead a manager not to a o¤er
a permanent contract to an employee who performs above average. The reason that
rules are strict is that they do not only incorporate the costs and benets of giving a
permanent position to a single employee, but incorporate the costs and benets of all
types of employees.
In this section we have derived the equilibrium for a simple probation model. In the
Appendix we consider a more general version of the probation model. We show that
results do not depend on the specic form of the distribution of abilities. Furthermore
we show that the results also hold if we consider a more general utility function.
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4 A Model of Di¤erentiation
In this section we focus on the case that the manager can send three messages:
M 2 f1  2; 1  2; 2  1g. The manager cannot replace employees as in the previ-
ous section. Instead she can compare employees on the basis of their abilities. We
assume that 1  2 (2  1) means that employee 1 (2) is more able than employee 2
(1). Message 1  2 means that employee 1 and 2 are more or less of the same abil-
ity. The exact meanings of messages are determined in equilibrium. We assume that
employees understand these meanings.
Given a2, the higher is a1, the stronger is the managers incentive to send 1  2
rather than 1  2 or 2  1. Sending 1  2 yields a higher payo¤ to the manager than
sending 1  2 if
(1  )[a1a^1 (1  2) + a2a^2 (1  2)] > (1  )[a1a^1 (1  2) + a2a^2 (1  2)]
implying
a1 > ta2 with t =
a^2 (1  2)  a^2 (1  2)
a^1 (1  2)  a^1 (1  2)
Likewise, one can show that the manager prefers sending 2  1 to sending 1  2
is a2 > 1ta1. The equilibrium of the model is characterized by a value of t implying
t = a^2(12) a^2(12)
a^1(12) a^1(12) . Proposition 3 presents the unique PBE equilibrium of the model of
di¤erentiation in which the manager sends all messages inM with a positive probability.
Proposition 3 An equilibrium of the model of di¤erentiation exists in which
(i) ei = a^i (m)
(ii) m = 1  2 if a1 > ta2;m = 2  1 if a1 < 1ta2 and m = 1  2 if 1ta2  a1  ta2
with t = 2 +
p
3.
(iii) a^1 (1  2) = a^2 (2  1) = 23 ; a^1 (2  1) = a^2 (1  2) = 13t ; a^1 (1  2) = a^2 (1  2) =
1
2
+ 1
6t
.
Proof. Given the managers message strategy, the posteriors result from
E (a1 j 1  2) =
R 1
0
R a1
t
0
a1da2da1R 1
0
R a1
t
0
da2da1
=
2
3
;
E (a1 j 2  1) =
R 1
t
0
R 1
a1t
a1da2da1R 1
t
0
R 1
a1t
da2da1
=
1
3t
12
and
E (a1 j 1  2) =
R 1
t
0
R a1t
a1
t
a1da2da1 +
R 1
1
t
R 1
a1
t
a1da2da1R 1
t
0
R a1t
a1
t
da2da1 +
R 1
1
t
R 1
a1
t
da2da1
=
1
2
+
1
6t
The manager is indi¤erent between m = 1  2 and m = 1  2 if
(1  ) a1ba1 (1  2)+(1  ) a2ba2 (1  2) = (1  ) a1ba1 (1  2)+(1  ) a2ba2 (1  2)
This equality can be written as
a1 = ta2 with t =
ba2 (1  2)  ba2 (1  2)ba1 (1  2)  ba1 (1  2)
Substituting the posteriors into the expression for t, and solving for t yields t = 2+
p
3.
Hence, the locus of pairs (a1; a2) for which the manager is indi¤erent between sending
1  2 and 1  2 is given by the line a1 =
 
2 +
p
3

a2. Because of symmetry, the line
a1 =
1
2+
p
3
a2 describes the locus of pairs (a1; a2) for which the manager is indi¤erent
between sending 2  1 and 1  2.
Figure 1: Managers message strategy in model of di¤erentiation without commitment
2~1
21f
12 f
1a
2a
0
0
1
1
Figure 1 depicts the managers message strategy. Two points are worth empha-
sizing. First, the manager treats employees equally especially when employees are
relatively able. Second, the manager treats employees equally for a wide range of abil-
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ities. Di¤erentiation is rare (the probability of m = 1  2 is equal to 1
2
1
t
 0:13).
Both points are related. An implication of our nding that managers abstain from dif-
ferentiating when employees are relatively able is that abstaining from di¤erentiation
boosts employeesself-images. Initially, the employees expected ability equals 1
2
. After
hearing 1  2, the employees expected ability is just below 0.55. Di¤erentiating boosts
the self-image of one agent at the expense of the other. As di¤erentiating occurs when
one of the agent has a fairly low ability, the total e¤ect of di¤erentiating on self-images
is negative. The upshot is that treating agents equally is optimal unless one agent is
really unable relative to the other agent.
The main message of Figure 1 is that managers are highly reluctant to di¤erentiate
employees on the basis of their relative abilities. This reluctance stems from a fear of
demotivating the employees passed over. Our model thus predicts that managers tend
to allocate tasks or give promotions on the basis of factors that are not directly related
to relative abilities, such as seniority.
4.1 Commitment
In the previous section, we have assumed that the manager sends a message after she
has observed the employeesabilities. We now turn to the case where the manager can
commit to a message strategy. The manager determines his di¤erentiation strategy
before she observes a1 and a2. We restrict ourselves to a di¤erentiation strategy as
in Proposition 3, where the manager sends m = 1  2 if a1 > tCa2, m = 2  1 if
a1 <
1
tC
a2 and m = 1  2 if 1tC a2  a1  tCa2. However, the manager can now commit
to a value of tC . Proposition 4 presents the equilibrium under commitment.
Proposition 4 Suppose the model of di¤erentiation and that the manager can commit
to a di¤erentiation strategy. Then, an equilibrium exists in which
(i) ei = a^i (m)
(ii) m = 1  2 if a1 > tCa2; m = 2  1 if a1 < 1tC a2 and m = 1  2 if 1tC a2  a1  tCa2
with tC = 1 + 15
p
10.
(iii) a^1 (1  2) = a^2 (2  1) = 23 ; a^1 (2  1) = a^2 (1  2) = 13tC ; a^1 (1  2) = a^2 (1  2) =
1
2
+ 1
6tC
.
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Proof. For the posteriors, see the proof of Proposition (3). The value of tC results
from maximizing the managers expected payo¤ when choosing tC :
(1  ) 2
Z 1
0
Z a1
tC
0

2
3
a1 +
1
3tC
a2

da2da1
+(1  )
Z 1
tC
0
Z a1tC
a1
tC

1
2
+
1
6tC

 (a1 + a2) da2da1
+(1  )
Z 1
1
tC
Z 1
a1
tC

1
2
+
1
6tC

 (a1 + a2) da2da1
= (1  )

1
18t3C
  5
18t2C
+
5
18tC
+
1
2

This expression is maximized for tC = 1 + 15
p
10
Figure 2: Managers message strategy in di¤erentiation model with commitment
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Figure 2 depicts the managers message strategy under commitment. The dashed
line corresponds to the combination of a1 and a2 for which the manager is indi¤erent
between 1  2 (2  1) and 1  2 in the absence of commitment. Clearly, under
commitment the manager di¤erentiates for a much wider range of parameters than in
the absence of commitment. Under commitment, the probability of di¤erentiation is
about 0:61 while in the absence of commitment it is about 0:27. The reason for this
large di¤erence is twofold. First, under commitment the manager takes into account
the consequences of her strategy for the employeesself-images. Without commitment,
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the manager takes employees self images as given. Second, under commitment the
manager takes into account the e¤ects of her strategy for all possible pairs of ability
levels, while in the absence of commitment the manager only considers the pairs of
ability levels for which she is indi¤erent between di¤erentiating and abstaining from
it. Specically, the larger is the area for which the manager does not di¤erentiate,
the smaller is the boost in employeesself-images when abstaining from di¤erentiation.
When the manager is able to commit herself, she can ensure that this area does not
become too large.
As in Section 3, we have found that managers practices under commitment dif-
fers from practices in the absence of commitment. Again, there is a role for written
guidelines. In practice, determining explicit guidelines for di¤erentiation may be more
di¢ cult than stipulating the conditions under which employees are allowed to stay.
Our results suggest that managers should try to create a culture in which relatively
talented employees are put in the spotlight.
5 Probation and Di¤erentiation
In this section, we assume thatM 2 fr1; r2; r1+2; 1  2; 1  2; 2  1g. This means that
the manager can replace one or both employees, and if she keeps both employees, she
can di¤erentiate between them. As in the probation model, the equilibrium depends on
the expected ability of the newcomer, z. We can distinguish two broad cases, namely
0  z < z and z  z  1
2
.4
Case 1: 0  z < z
As we will argue below, the most striking feature of the equilibria for low values of
z is that the manager never sends the messages r1 and r2. Therefore, in equilibrium,
four messages are sent, fr1+2; 1  2; 1  2; 2  1g. The following equations denote the
values of a1 and a2 for which the manager is indi¤erent between pairs of these messages.
4The value of z is close to 0.43.
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Because of symmetry, we may limit the analysis to a1  a2.
2z2 = a1ba1 (1  2) + a2ba2 (1  2) (10)
2z2 = a1ba1 (1  2) + a2ba2 (1  2) (11)
a1ba1 (1  2) + a2ba2 (1  2) = a1ba1 (1  2) + a2ba2 (1  2) (12)
Equation (10) shows the condition under which the manager is indi¤erent between
sending both employees away on the one hand, and keeping both employees and treating
them equally on the other.5 Equation (11) gives the condition under which the manager
is indi¤erent between sending both employees away on the one hand, and keeping both
employees and di¤erentiating between them on the other. Finally, (12) shows the
condition under which the manager is indi¤erent between treating employees equally
and di¤erentiating between them, provided that the employees may stay.
Equations (10-12) are linear lines determining the areas where the principal sends
the alternative messages. The slopes and intercepts of the lines depend on the various
expected abilities conditional on messages.6 In equilibrium, the positions of the lines
should lead to consistent conditional expectations of abilities. These conditional expec-
tations, however, are non-linear expressions of slopes and intercepts. As a result, the
model cannot be solved analytically. For this reason, we rely on numerical solutions.
The numerical analysis showed that for each z a unique equilibrium exists.
Figure 3 presents the equilibria for z = 0:1 and z = 0:4. For z = 0:1, the equilibrium
is very similar to the equilibrium of the model of di¤erentiation. Because of the low
value of z, the principal rarely sends employees away. For z = 0:4, the area of a1
and a2 for which the principal sends both employees away is larger. However, also for
this relatively high value of z, in equilibrium the principal is most likely to keep both
employees.
Let us now try to provide an intuition for the result that the manager never sends
r1 and r2. The implication is that the manager wants to keep a completely unable
employee if the other employee is fairly able (e.g. send 1  2, when a2 = 0). Consider
the managers equilibrium strategy presented in Figure 3 for z = 0:1. Suppose that in
this equilibrium the manager sends r2 if (a1; a2) is not in the r1+2 area and a2 = 0. In
5Because of symmetry ba1 (1  2) = ba2 (1  2).
6Equation (10), for example, can be written as a1 =   a2 with  = 2z2a^1(12) and  = 1.
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Figure 3: Probation and Di¤erentiation model: Managers message strategy for low values
of z
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such an equilibrium, the newcomer would not be much more productive (in absolute
terms) than the employee being sent away: z2 with z2 = 0:01. Employee 1s expected
ability when the manager sends r2 would be just above a half. Sending 1  2, however,
leads to an expected ability of agent 1 just above 2
3
. As a result, member 1 would be
much more productive if the manager sends 1  2 rather than r2 (close to 
 
4
9
  1
4

).
The benet of sending 1  2 therefore exceeds the cost. Hence, the manager prefers
sending 1  2 to sending r2. Obviously, for high values of z (z > z  0:43), the cost
of not replacing a completely unproductive employee is much higher. Moreover, if z
is high, the message r2 would boost employee 1s reputation signicantly. As a result,
the manager gets an incentive to send r2.
Case 2: z  z  1
2
As discussed above, for large values of z, it becomes too costly to keep low ability
employees just for the purpose of di¤erentiation. For z > z, the manager sometimes
wants to replace the low ability employee and to keeps the high ability employee. Now
depending on a1 and a2 the manager either replaces both, keeps both or decides to keep
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one and replace the other. If the manager keeps both employees, then she additionally
decides to di¤erentiate between the employees or not. Besides equation (10-12), the
following equations denote the values of a1 and a2 for which the manager is indi¤erent
between two messages. Because of symmetry we may again focus on a1  a2.
2z2 = a1ba1 (r2) + z2 (13)
a1ba1 (r2) + z2 = a1ba1 (1  2) + a2ba2 (1  2) (14)
a1ba1 (r2) + z2 = a1ba1 (1  2) + a2ba2 (1  2) (15)
Equation (13) shows the condition under which the manager is indi¤erent between
sending both employees away on the one hand, and sending only employee 2 away on
the other. Equation (14) and (15) show the condition under which the manager is
indi¤erent between sending only employee 2 away on the one hand, and keeping both
employees on the other with no di¤erentiation and di¤erentiation, respectively. Figure
4 shows the managers equilibrium strategy for z = 0:45 and z = 0:5.
Figure 4: Probation and Di¤erentiation model: Managers message strategy for intermediate
values of z
z = 0.45 z = 0.50
0
1
1
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As in the previous case the manager only di¤erentiates between employees if one
employee is really able while the other is really unable. The main di¤erence between
Figure 4 and Figure 3 is that for z > z the manager sometimes chooses to replace only
one employee. As z increases, it becomes more costly to keep a low ability worker just
for the purpose of di¤erentiation. The manager only chooses to keep both employees
and di¤erentiate if one is really able while the other has a much lower ability but is not
completely unable. More specically, from Figure 4 it follows that the manager never
keeps an employee with an ability of zero. Altogether, also in this combined model we
observe that the manager treats the employees equally for a wide range of abilities.
5.1 Commitment
Let us nally analyze the case in which the manager can commit herself to a probation
and di¤erentiation strategy. We assume that the probation strategy describes an ability
threshold aC an employee must pass to stay in the company. More specically, if
ai < a

C , then employee i is replaced by an employee with expected ability z. The
di¤erentiation strategy is relevant if a1 > aC and a2 > a

C . Then, the manager may
reveal that one employee is more able than the other, or she may abstain from such
a comparison. As before, we limit ourselves to three messages: m = 1  2 if a1 >
tCa2; m = 2  1 if a1 < 1tC a2 and m = 1  2 if 1tC a2  a1  tCa2, all messages
conditional on a1 > aC and a2 > a

C . The managers HRM strategy under commitment
is characterized by two parameters aC and tC . The equilibrium values of a

C and tC
maximize the managers expected payo¤.
As the game of the previous section, the present game cannot be solved analytically.
Therefore, we again have to rely on a numerical analysis. Figure 5 presents for z = 0:5
the optimal message strategy under commitment.
In general, Figure 5 conrms our ndings of the previous sections. Under commitment,
the requirements for an employee to stay are much harsher than in the absence of com-
mitment. Moreover, the manager di¤erentiates for a much wider range of parameters.
If we only consider the cases where both employees are kept, then the probability of
di¤erentiation if z = 0:50 is about 0:57 under commitment, while in the absence
of commitment it is about 0:34. Most importantly, the set of parameters for which
the manager keeps both employees and does not di¤erentiate is much smaller under
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Figure 5: Probation and Di¤erentiation model: Managers message strategy under commit-
ment (z = 0:50)
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commitment than in the absence of commitment (see Table 2).
Table 2: Probability that the manager keeps both
employees and does not di¤erentiate
z Commitment No Commitment
0.0 0.22 0.73
0.1 0.21 0.73
0.2 0.19 0.72
0.3 0.16 0.68
0.4 0.12 0.61
0.45 0.41
0.5 0.09 0.37
All in all, our results demonstrate that formulating requirements for human resource
management practices in advance has important consequences. On the one hand it
leads to stricter criteria about which employees should be o¤ered a permanent position.
On the other hand, these written guidelines should o¤er su¢ cient room to di¤erentiate.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We have
considered a model in which HRM decisions a¤ect employeesself-images and thereby
their motivation. We have shown that in the absence of rules, managers are too reluc-
tant to di¤erentiate between employees on the basis of their abilities. Besides managers
tend to shy away from ring employees on probation. Finally, we have shown that an
organization benets from committing to strict rules for two common HRM practices.
7 Appendix
In this Appendix we relax the assumption that the workers ability is uniformly distrib-
uted. Suppose that the workers ability, a, is drawn from a distribution g (a) on [0; 1].
Furthermore, we consider a more general payo¤ functions. Output y is a function of
e¤ort and ability, y = f (e; a). We assume that fe > 0, fee < 0, fa > 0, and that e¤ort
and ability are complements, fea > 0. To keep the analysis tractable, we consider the
probation model with only one worker. The timing of the probation model is as follows.
First the manager decides whether to keep the worker or to replace him, m 2 fK;Rg.
Second, if the worker receives m = K, he decides how much e¤ort to exert. If the
worker receives m = R, then the worker is replaced and his utility equals zero.
Suppose that the managers retention rule is: Keep the worker if a  a and replace
him otherwise. First, suppose that the worker is retained (m = K). Then the workers
utility is given by E [f (e; a)  c (e) j m = K]. The costs of e¤ort are c (e), with ce > 0
and cee > 0. Let e be the workers e¤ort choice if m = K. The e¤ort choice e follows
implicitly from
fe (e
;ba (K))  ce (e) = 0 (16)
where ba (K) is the expectation of a conditional on message K. Using the implicit
function theorem we can determine
@e
@a
=  Fa
Fe
=   fea
fee   cee (17)
we know that fea > 0, fee < 0 and cee > 0. This implies that @e

@a
> 0.
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Second, suppose that the worker is replaced (m = R). Then the newcomer knows
that his expected ability equals z, and he will choose the e¤ort level that maximizes
his utility function. Let ez be the newcomers e¤ort choice. The e¤ort choice ez follows
implicitly from
fe (e
z; z)  ce (ez) = 0
The next step is to determine the threshold value a. The payo¤ of the manager
equals (1  ) f (e; a). The optimal e¤ort level e of a worker who obtains m = K
follows implicitly from equation (16). At a = a, the manager is indi¤erent between
keeping the worker and replacing him. This means that a solves
(1  ) f (e; a) = (1  ) f (ez; z) (18)
We can show that a < z. We show this by contradiction. Suppose that a = z.
Then a worker who receives m = K knows that his ability will be between z and 1,
implying that ba (K) > z. From equation (17) we know that the larger the expected
ability is, the higher the exerted e¤ort is. This means that e > ez if a = z. An
implication is that the left-hand side of (18) is larger than the right-hand side if a = z.
To make the left-hand side and the right-hand side equal, it must hold that a < z.
Next, suppose that the manager can commit to retention rule: Keep the worker if
a  aC , replace otherwise. If a worker is retained (m = K), then the workers choice
of e¤ort eC follows (implicitly) from
fe (e

C ;caC (K))  ce (eC) = 0
The next step is to determine aC . The threshold value a

C follows from the following
rst order condition
E = G (aC) f (e
z; z) + (1 G (aC)) f (eC ; aC)
@E
@aC
= g (aC) (f (e
z; z)  f (eC ; aC)) + (1 G (aC))

faC (e

C ; a

C) + feC (e

C ; a

C)
@eC
@aC

= 0
We can show that aC > a
 by contradiction. Suppose that aC = a
, then according
to equation (18) a is chosen such that f (eC ; a

C) = f (e
z; z). An implication is that
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the rst part of the rst order condition equals zero if aC = a
. The second part of the
rst order condition is positive. Hence if aC = a
 then @E
@aC
> 0. This means that aC
will be larger than a.
If we assume that the workers utility function ifm = K equalsE

ae  1
2
e2 j m = K
then we can additionally show that if the manager can commit to the retention rule
that aC > z. If a worker is retained (m = K), then the workers choice of e¤ort is
e = caC (K) = R 1aC ag(a)daR 1
a
C
g(a)da
. The next step is to determine aC .
E = G (aC) z
2 + (1 G (aC)) (caC (K))2
@E
@aC
= g (aC) (z
2   (caC (K))2) + 2 (1 G (aC))caC (K) @caC (K)@aC = 0 (19)
From this inequality we can derive that caC (K) > z. The second part of the rst
order condition is positive. The reason is that a workers expected ability increases in
the threshold the manager uses. A worker knows that if he receives the message K,
that his ability is at least equal to the threshold. Hence, the higher the threshold is
that the manager uses, the higher the expected ability of the worker is. Given that the
second part is positive, equation (19) can only hold if the rst part of the equation is
negative. This implies that z < (caC (K)).
The next step is to show that aC > z. This does not immediately follow from
the rst order condition. Applying Leibniz rule, we nd that @caC(K)
@aC
=  a

Cg(aC)
G(aC)
+
caC (K) g(aC)G(aC) . If we substitute this into equation (19) we get
@E
@aC
= g (aC)
 
z2   (caC (K))2+1 G (aC)
G (aC)
  2caC (K) aCg (aC) + 2 (caC (K))2 g (aC) = 0
First suppose that aC = z, then we can replace a

C with z in the rst order condition
g (z)
 
z2   (caC (K))2+ 1 G (z)
G (z)
  2caC (K) zg (z) + 2 (caC (K))2 g (z)
= g (z)
1 G (z)
G (z)

 2caC (K) z + 2 (caC (K))2 + G (z)
1 G (z)
 
z2   (caC (K))2
For G (z)  1
2
the expression between the brackets is positive. Hence, for aC = z
we nd that @E
@aC
> 0. This implies that aC > z. 
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